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CONTEXT
1984
– constitutional and foreign currency crisis 
– led to “one of the most notable episodes of liberalisation that 
history has to offer” Henderson (1995)
Political and public policy consensus
– stable, credible, mutually consistent macroeconomic policies
– efficient allocation of resources
– achieving a competitive environment “wherever possible”
– markets operating relatively free from government 
intervention 
NEW ZEALAND’S ECONOMY
Small size, small population, low population density, 
geographical isolation, challenging terrain, thin capital 
markets, highly-concentrated industries
Predominant competition issue:
– elimination of market power per se not feasible
• pursuit of scale & scope economies makes it inevitable
– ex ante regulation costly per capita/per account
• also, negative effect on private sector investment incentives 
– challenge is to design framework where dominant parties 
can trade, but discourages exertion of dominance
COMMERCE ACT 1986 (First version)
Purpose
– promotion of competition in markets “for the long term 
benefit of consumers in New Zealand”
Section 36
– no person who has a dominant position in a market shall use 
that position for the purpose of restricting entry or preventing
competitive conduct in any market, or eliminating any person 
from any market
Section 27
– constrains opportunities for two or more firms to jointly 
exercise dominance
Section 47
– Terms under which firms can merge
‘LIGHT-HANDED’ REGULATION
Natural monopoly characteristics of former state-owned 
utilities required further safeguards
Specific information disclosure
– transparency of performance
– facilitates negotiations with businesses
Threat of further regulation if market dominance is 
abused
– Part IV of the Commerce Act
‘Lightly regulated’ but far from ‘unregulated’
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1984
State-owned
– bundled with post and savings bank
Substantial inefficiencies
– productive
• substitute for unemployment welfare
• politically-motivated investment decisions
– poor service quality
• 6-8 week queues for connections; waits for of several hours 
during peak times for national/international connections 
Insulated from competition
– legislative protection for government provision
– monopoly for provision of equipment
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1987
Telecommunications separated from post and banking 
into arms-length state-owned corporation 1 April 1989
– with view to privatisation
Consistent with ‘light-handed’ principles
Using an industry-specific regulator (e.g. Australia) or 
structural separation (e.g. United States) rejected on 
efficiency grounds
Legislative protections removed
Reporting obligations
– transparent financial statements; regular reports to Ministry of
Commerce; contracts offering discounts of more than 10% of 
listed prices to be disclosed
PRIVATISATION 1990
Consortium – Bell Atlantic & Ameritech 12 September 
($4.25 billion)
– requirement to sell majority of shares to private investors –
achieved 19 July 1991
– NZ’s largest listed company (20-25% NZX capitalisation)
Reporting obligations transferred
‘Kiwi Share’ obligations
– ‘price cap’ on residential rentals 
• CPI – x  where x = 0 
– residential ‘free local calling’
• some of largest local calling regions in the OECD
– residential ‘universal service’
• rural rentals no higher than urban rentals
COMPETITION FROM 1991
Clear Communications 1991
– long distance, international
• 20% market share in national; 23% international in first 5 years
– attempted entry into local calling in 1991
– purchased by TelstraSaturn in 2001 to form TelstraClear
Saturn Communications 1991
– regional fibre-optic cable; cable internet from 1999 (Kapiti, 
Wellington, Christchurch)
BellSouth (mobile) 1994
– GSM network established Telecom TDMA/CDMA network 
originated in 1988
– purchased by Vodafone in 1998
Telstra New Zealand 1996
– purchased Saturn, 1999; Clear, 2001 forming TelstraClear
COMPETITION (cont)
CityLink 1995
– regionally-focused Ethernet LAN, WLAN hotspots 
(Wellington, Auckland)
iHug 1996
– ISP, nationwide satellite internet from 1998
Walker Wireless (subsequently Woosh) 2001
– wireless services in 10 urban areas
Wired Country (subsequently Compass) 2002
– fibre-optic cable and wireless, greater Auckland area
– based on electricity lines company rights of way
Many regional wireless operations post 2002
– e.g. The PacificNet, Nelson/Marlborough
– many allied with Fonterra dairy farm connection contracts
Kordia
– broadcasting transmission - trunk
LITIGATION 1991-4
Telecom – Clear Interconnection Agreement (ICA) 1991
Telecom charged Clear using Efficient Component 
Pricing Rule
– rationale = recovery of ‘Kiwi Share’ costs
Clear claimed ECPR prices a breach of Section 36
Litigation
ECPR
– efficient in some circumstances as enables recovery of costs 
of social obligations
– but may deter efficient entry in some circumstances
RULINGS
High Court 1993
– S36 precludes monopoly pricing only when used to restrict, 
prevent or eliminate competition from market
Court of Appeal 1993
– cannot lawfully charge an interconnection price including a 
component of monopoly rent
Privy Council 1994
– charging based on opportunity cost exactly what occurs in 
competitive markets
– ECPR allows Clear to compete away monopoly retail prices 
over time
– Clear had not proved Telecom’s price included rent over and 
above that required to recover universal service costs
CHALLENGES TO ‘LIGHT-HANDED’ REGIME
Long time taken to reach settlement
– interim uncertainty prevented further entry occurring
Narrow interpretation of ‘use’ under S36
– what is deemed a legal competitive action under ‘use’ may 
lead to an inefficient outcome in the market
Courts can adjudicate only the behaviour contested
– cannot consider other factors (e.g. counter-offers)
‘Kiwi Share’ retail obligations create pricing dilemmas in 
upstream markets
– how to price upstream elements so
a) Telecom can recover fair costs of social obligation
b) efficient competitive entry in downstream markets is 
facilitated
INQUIRY 1995
Led by The Treasury & Ministry of Commerce
Efficiency is paramount objective
Examined options w.r.t. ownership, pricing and 
regulatory restrictions 
Recommended 
– no restraints on ownership
– a pricing rule be adopted that would be ‘efficient’
• but did not recommend a specific rule
MEANWHILE
Telecom offered Clear a contract based on Court of 
Appeal decision
– elimination of rents from ICA price
– separate contribution to ‘Kiwi Share’ obligations
– varying scale of IAC charges decreasing over time
– audit of charges set by mutually-agreed independent auditor
Clear rejected offer
– did not recognise reciprocity, take account of differences in 
call volumes
– counter-offered with contract equalising per-minute charge
Minister threatened to intervene if a satisfactory 
agreement not reached quickly
AGREEMENT 1996
Terms agreed March 1996
– 5 year contract
– Clear pays Telecom 2c/min for calls terminating on Telecom
– Telecom pays Clear from 1c to 2c per minute (scaled over time) 
for calls terminating on Clear
– all interconnect charges discounted 75% for off-peak
– Clear pays Telecom 1c per minute for all calls in recognition of
‘Kiwi Share’ obligations
– all past disputes as at September 4 1995 considered settled
Minister reaffirms reliance upon existing regime June 1996
– no changes are to be made
AUGUST 1996 (5 months after contract signed)
Clear requested variation to ICA
– Telecom making capped-price retail offers –
uncompetitive???
Telecom refused
– capped-price offers trialled pre March (Clear had knowledge)
– only 5 months into 5 year agreement
Clear began withholding a percentage of ICA payments 
from February 1997
Telecom refrained from withholding service (as allowed 
by contract)
– feared another S36 action
– pursued debt through courts
CONFIDENCE IN COURT DECISIONS ERODING
Telecom sued for payment
Clear counterclaimed, alleging capped-price offers 
breached s36
Both High Court and Court of Appeal found that Clear 
could withhold payments pending settlement of the 
S36 dispute via separate proceedings
Another ‘inefficient’ court decision
– Telecom must supply services to Clear for an indeterminate 
period with no certainty of compensation
• Telecom is ‘underwriting’ Clear’s competitive activities
• implications for Telecom’s forward-looking investment plans 
(dynamically inefficient)
– inconsistent with a similar decision in the gas industry
NO SECTION 36 CAPPED-PRICE LITIGATION
Competitive forces overtake it
Dial-up internet calls
– unmetered local calling under ‘Kiwi Share’
– exponential increase in 
• dial-up ISP consumers
• PSTN data call volumes and call lengths
TELECOM PSTN TRAFFIC 1996-2003
THE ‘ISP WARS’
Clear, other entrants, can arbitrage on ICA by signing up 
ISPs to their networks
– share ICA cash flows from Telecom with ISPs
ISPs share cash flows with customers by discounting ISP 
subscriptions
– highly competitive ISP market
• fuels rapid increase in ISP uptake, usage
• Telecom’s ISP Xtra aggressively markets flat-rate ISP charges
• ‘free’ ISPs emerge
• prices 30% lower than Australia; subscription numbers 13% higher
in 1999, despite only 1/3 the number of ISPs
Huge increase in consumer welfare
– transfer from Telecom (unmetered usage to all dial-up users plus 
ICA/ISP arbitrage payments to non-Telecom ISPs)
– dynamic gains from new technology
DIAL-UP USAGE PER ISP ACCOUNT
TELECOM RESPONSE
1. Stop the cash flows to non-Telecom ISPs 
• ‘average’ non-Telecom ISP customer generating higher 
monthly ICA liability than monthly line rental paid (rivals 
had 50% market share)
• 0867 package
• unmetered dial-up only on Telecom-terminating 0867 ISPs
• first 10 hours only unmetered on non-0867 numbers; 2c per 
minute thereafter
2. Migrate internet users off the PSTN as soon as 
possible
• early and rapid implementation of ADSL
• January 1999 – 3rd in the OECD
• nationwide – 85% of customer lines by 2002
• high quality (2Mbps base offering)
• low prices (3rd-lowest in the OECD in 2000, taking into 
account speed etc.) 
• universal pricing
RESPONSES
Government satisfied with 0867 package as long as 
service quality maintained
– long-run threat to market if Telecom financially unviable 
Commerce Commission lays charges under Section 36
– “in introducing 0867 Telecom sought to prevent or deter 
competitive conduct by other telecommunications network 
operators and Internet service providers”
– to date, still not settled
– interesting issue is market definition: internet or 
interconnect?
ICA runs its full five years
– ‘bill and keep’ agreed in 2001
– end result a draw?
Dynamic efficiency potential in the broadband market
AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
NZ one of the world’s leading internet-using populations
– users per capita
– secure servers per capita
– hours of usage per month
– low prices, universal pricing
– wide availability, multiple technologies
– high quality services
– highly competitive ISP market (low margins, prices)
No evidence that the ‘light-handed regime had 
performed worse than any other regime
– telephone price index fallen by more than the OECD 
average
– plus dynamic efficiencies of early internet adoption and use
– competitive entry
NZ REAL RESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE PRICE 
INDEX 1991-2001
OECD TELEPHONE CHARGE TIME SERIES
A TRUIMPH FOR ‘LIGHT-HANDED’
REGULATION?
Procedural concerns still remained
– court cases took long time to be resolved/create uncertainty
– tension between ‘increased competition’ and ‘increased 
efficiency’ remains unresolved
Telecom still had a dominant position in the market
‘Kiwi Share’ obligations still causing distortions
– who should bear costs?
– how is it distorting entry decisions?
• accusations of predatory pricing when Telecom matched 
Saturn prices in Wellington 
• ‘ISP wars’ would have been muted by per-minute charging
POLITICAL INTERVENTION
Labour coalition-led government elected November 
1999
– differentiate from historic Labour (1984) government
– promised tightening of the Commerce Act and reviews of 
Electricity and Telecommunications markets
Commerce Act 2001
– alignment with Australian Trade Practices Act
– s36 ‘use’ replaced by ‘take advantage of’
– extend application to “major participants in an oligopolistic
market”
– “signal to the courts some dissatisfaction with the focus on 
‘use’ tests as a basis of interpretation of this section”
MINISTERIAL INQUIRY INTO 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 2000
Government policy “to ensure that the regulatory environment 
delivers cost-efficient, timely and innovative telecommunications 
services on an ongoing fair and equitable basis to all existing 
and potential users”
Interpretation:
– ‘cost-efficient’ = “at the lowest cost and delivered to 
consumers at the lowest sustainable price” (i.e. perfect 
productive and allocative efficiency)
– ‘timely’ = “the absence of barriers that would impede the 
implementation and uptake of innovative services” (i.e. 
dynamic efficiency)
– ‘ongoing’ = “regulation should be forward-looking, robust, 
reliable and consistent over time, and not sacrifice long-term 
gains for short-term considerations (i.e. trade-off between 
static and dynamic efficiency)
PERFECT STATIC & DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY 
PLUS PERFECT CONSUMER AND 
COMPETITOR EQUITY
Interpretation (cont)
– ‘fair and equitable’ = ensuring that all existing and potential 
users have affordable access to a minimum level and 
standard of services”
– ‘fair and equitable to all existing and potential users’ also 
means “the way in which services are provided, the conduct 
of the industry players and their interactions” (i.e. competitor 
equity) 
An impossible hurdle?
– no indication given of priorities/weights given amongst 
competing objectives
RECOMMENDATIONS
No convincing evidence was found using efficiency-
based criteria that New Zealand’s regime had 
performed worse than any other regime form during 
the 1990s 
Yet industry-specific regulation was recommended, 
because the regime had failed the ‘perfection’ test
– cost-based pricing principles (ultimately TSLRIC) for 
‘designated’ services (Telecom fixed line and data tail 
services – excluding ADSL)
– retail minus pricing for ‘specified’ services (wholesaled 
Telecom services, mobile roaming, co-location
But specification, designation to be “based on efficient 
competition, connectivity and investment, where efficiency takes
into account all of its productive allocative and dynamic 
contexts”
RECOMMENDATIONS (cont)
LLU not to be either designated or specified
– “any regulatory erosion of producer surplus related to 
enhanced services such as ADSL is likely to have an 
adverse impact on dynamic efficiency by dampening 
incentives for investment in competing infrastructure
‘Kiwi Share’ to remain Telecom’s responsibility alone
– “interconnection prices should not include a contribution to 
any losses arising from the ‘Kiwi Share’ obligations”
– no compensation other than by applying to the Minister to 
raise prices as a consequence of financial losses
=> Inherent tension between Regulator and Minister
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 2001
Followed most of recommendations except:
Commission within Commerce Commission 
– not independent
‘Kiwi Share’ costs to be reported annually by Telecom 
and apportioned across the industry by the 
Commission (renamed ‘Telecommunications Service 
Order – TSO)
– removed obligation from Telecom’s upstream prices to rivals
– but Telecom must bear costs until compensated
Inquiry into LLU and recommendations by end of 2003
COMMISSIONER APPOINTED 2002
March – took up duties
May - first application for determination (Telecom and 
TelstraClear)
July – TSO, price benchmarking and TSLRIC 
conferences
November
– 5th - first draft ‘designated service’ determination
• Telecom/TelstraClear ICA 1.13c/minute, backdated to 1 
July
– 29th – first ‘specified service’ determination
• between 14% and 18% discount on Telecom’s wholesale 
services
WAS THE REGIME WORKING?
Access to Telecom wholesale products dilutes 
incentives to invest in alternative platforms
– TelstraClear CEO (welcoming the November 29 wholesale 
agreement, shortly after TCL’s rollout of fibre-optic cable 
network in Christchurch had been suspended): “we believe it 
is more efficient for TelstraClear to buy from Telecom rather 
than build duplicate networks to reach consumers who are 
widely spread throughout New Zealand”
Easy access to a regulatory determination removes 
most of the incentives for the parties to commit effort 
to resolving the issues independently 
2003
Determinations sought by TelstraClear, iHug, CallPlus, 
Compass, WorldXChange
Each determination required:
– issues paper; responses; conference; draft ruling; responses 
to draft ruling; final ruling
– each one an identical process to court-contested contract
– except every contract appears to have been contested rather 
than merely one or two
Most determinations for 12 month period only
– redeterminations sought almost as soon as determinations 
given
Simultaneously:
– the first TSO determination
– LLU Inquiry
Second year Commission expenses double the 2000 
Inquiry projections
IMPROVED TIMELINESS?
TSO determinations
Period 21 December 2001 to 30 June 2002
– begun March 2002
– delivered December 18 2003 (21 months)
Period 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003
– finalised 24 March 2005 (34 months)
Period 1 July to 30 June 2004
– still not finalised (36+ months) 
2005? 2006? 2007?????
Mobile termination decision
– begun April 2004, not resolved until April 2007
The 1990s court case took only 3 years
DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY CONSEQUENCES
TSO delays - huge uncertainty for both incumbent and 
new entrants
– what retail prices to charge/entry decision to make when tax 
for social obligations unknown?
– more uncertain than in 1991, as Clear then at least knew 
Telecom’s price expectation (however contested) was an 
upper bound on obligation – entry decision could be based 
on it
No competing services of the contested type provided 
until determination finalised
– unlike the ‘ISP Wars’ when Telecom and TelstraClear were 
fighting simultaneously in the market and the courtroom
– could efficiency gains of the magnitude of the ‘ISP Wars’
arise under the current arrangements? 
A STATIC MARKET??
LLU REVIEW 2003-4
Change of recommendation between draft and final
Key issues came down to dynamic efficiency
– static benefits based on highly contested cost-benefit 
analysis small
– risks to Telecom’s investment in Next Generation Network 
substantial
• agreement with Alcatel in 2002 to roll out world’s first fully fibre-
based network 
– so Commission finally recommended against full LLU
Instead recommended limited bitstream unbundling
– based on Telecom offer brought to conference
– would enable competition in DSL without risk of stranding 
entrants’ assets (e.g. DSLAMs) when NGN rolled out 
– specifically addressed residential, provincial  and SME 
market (already extensive  platform competition in most 
urban CBDs)
BITSTREAM OPERATIONALISATION
May 24 2004 – Minister accepts recommendation; 
formally regulated July 13. 
June 25 – Telecom agrees to have product available 
from September 30
– targets set – 250,000 broadband connections by end of 
2005; 1/3 new entrants (Dec 2003 – entrants have 35% 
market share under existing wholesale agreements)
September 3 – Commission releases price 
benchmarking report
– TSLRIC based on comparable markets (density, geography, 
market size, distances from exchange etc).  
September 30 – product launched according to plan
October 8 – Commission satisfied Telecom meeting 
obligations
THE DETERMINATION DANCE RESUMES
Nov 4 2004 – TCL applies for wholesale access to 
Telecom VPN services
Nov 4 – TCL applies for determination on access to 
bitstream as fast as the line allows
Nov 9 – iHug makes similar bitstream request
Dec 23 2004 – iHug withdraws 
– has come to satisfactory arrangement with Telecom
December 8 2005– VPN decision announced
– retail less 16% (13 months)
December 20 2005 – TCL determination announced
– best available speed on line for $27.87 
PAS DE DEUX (ET TROIS, ET QUARTRES)
Jan 3 2006 – TCL applies for redetermination of Dec 8 
ruling
Jan 10 – Telecom applies as well
Jan 17 – both withdraw
March 29 – iHug and CallPlus apply for nationwide 
best-offers bitstream determination
June 22 – iHug/CallPlus determination $28.04
October 20 – iHug/CallPlus revised determination 
$27.76
December 12 – iHug requests reconsideration of 
October 20 ruling
December 18 – CallPlus follows suit
……….
New Zealand ADSL Market 2003-2006
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MOBILE TERMINATION 2004-6
Telecom CDMA, Vodafone GSM; Evidence of high prices
Commission investigates fixed-mobile termination from April 
2004
Decision process 
1. LLU decision based on increase on total welfare (small => 
recommended against regulation)
2. Mobile termination decision based on consumer welfare gain 
(total welfare plus transfers) – significant => regulation 
recommended with proviso – only 2G networks (dynamic 
efficiency considerations)
3. Minister sends issue back for reconsideration – can distinction in 
technologies be justified?
4. Commission reviews – April 2006 satisfied that 3G network 
investment decisions now irreversible – recommends regulating 
all fixed-mobile termination
REVISED RULING A WATERSHED
Telecommunications Act uses different standard of test 
(consumer welfare) from Commerce Act (total 
welfare)
– based on Commerce Act Part IV – regulation of existing 
market power
Primacy of competition over efficiency
“Where there is a tension between the net public benefits and 
promotion of competition, the statutory context indicates that the 
primary consideration is the promotion of competition … the 
Telecommunications Act is focused on regulating access to 
promote competition.  It does not provide a mechanism that 
specifically allows for efficiency considerations to take 
precedence over the promotion of competition.  Nor is there 
anything in the statutory scheme to suggest that this is the case”
‘COMPETITION’ IS NOW THE END IN ITSELF
No longer a means to the end of efficiency
– efficiency outcomes now collateral by-products in the pursuit 
of ‘competition’
But what is ‘competition’?
– a process?
– an end-state?
– how is it measured?
– which form? – price? non-price?
What does it mean in a small market such as New 
Zealand?
– where are scale/scope economies relevant?
POLITICISATION OF ‘COMPETITION’
September 17 2005 – triennial general election
Labour Party manifesto
– “this Labour-led government has ended the destructive 
period of ultra-light handed regulation that stifled 
competition, growth and consumer choice in ICT markets”
– Will ‘closely monitor and enforce commitments made by 
Telecom New Zealand under the local loop unbundling 
decisions and ensure targets for broadband uptake for the 
next three years as outlined in the Digital Strategy are met”
Speech from the Throne November 9
– “with respect to ICT, my government will be advancing 
policies to ensure that the telecommunications sector 
becomes more competitive and that we achieve faster 
broadband uptake in line with our competitors”
‘STOCKTAKE’
Begun December 2
– focus on broadband uptake
February 2, 2006
– Commissioner reports Telecom has exceeded broadband 
account target by 11.6%, but only 24.5% sold by competitors
– note from previous graph – this is the most ‘competitive’ the 
market has been for at least 12 months (low point 19% in Q4 
2005)
– NZ is now on the third-highest broadband growth trajectory 
in the OECD (confirmed by OECD figures, Dec 2006 – slope 
of curve unchanged since  Q3, 2004)
May 2, 2006
– report released (amidst controversy)
STOCKTAKE REPORT
Finds low broadband uptake a ‘competition problem’ that 
can only be ‘solved’ by full LLU, structural separation of 
Telecom 
– based on rudimentary, unscientific analyses 
• no literature review of linkage between unbundling and 
broadband uptake; misuses small amount of literature 
actually cited
• only Telecom’s historic investment scrutinised (no 
observation of other parties reducing investment under 
bitstreaming); investment ‘problem’ determined principally 
from slippage in NGN project investment plan 2003 targets
– cost-benefit analysis deemed unnecessary
• competition benchmark (market shares) now prevails over 
efficiency benchmarks (either consumer or total welfare)
– broadband uptake and sector investment will increase under 
LLU because OECD officials said it will; and some entrants 
said they would invest more if unbundling occurred
• Government officials voice concerns about the OECD’s ‘cavalier 
attitude’ to investment 
• suggest it warrants further consideration
MARKET RESPONSE
Telecom shares plummet 23%
– 5% decline in NZX capitalisation
– $3-4 billion dollars of shareholder wealth destroyed
• but as efficiency does not matter any more, this is a justified 
price to be paid in the pursuit of competition?
Structural separation plans announced April 2007
– no evidence offered of Telecom favouring its own ISP
• very difficult to conclude any favouritism given cost-based 
bitstream prices claimed by entrants to be too small to make a 
viable entry case upon
– Telecom pronounces government plans ‘unworkable’
• can justify investing only $0.5 billion of $1.5 billion needed to 
deliver network as specified by government
• credible commitment to claim – returns $1.1 billion of sale of 
directories business to Shareholders in May 
CODA
February 28, 2006: 
– the Economic Development Minister (not Minister of 
Communications) announces that the mobile termination decision is 
being deferred whilst the Crown engages in a negotiation with 
Vodafone and Telecom
April 30 2007:
– 5 year agreement announced (Minister of Economic Development)
– effectively same outcome as Commission’s April 2006 (revised) 
recommendation
May 31 2007:
– Minister of Communications announces (in a speech) that 
he, not the Commissioner, will lead unbundling and 
separation processes
– new Commissioner announced in same speech
359 DEGREE SWING OF PENDULUM?
1984
– Government controls decisions about application of 
Telecom’s capital
– capital provided by taxpayers who are compelled to provide 
funds for core network enhancement withdraw
2007
– Government controls decisions about application of 
Telecom’s capital
– capital provided by shareholders who cannot be compelled 
to provide capital for core network enhancement
Who will invest if Telecom does not?
LESSONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES
1. It cannot be concluded from the New Zealand 
changes that ‘light-handed’, competition law-based 
regulation has ‘failed’
• no tests yet on new Commerce Act (precluded by resort to 
regulatory determination)
• the available evidence cannot discount hypothesis that it 
has performed equally well on most dimensions, with 
significant advantages in dynamic efficiency elements
2. It is not possible to have ‘just a little bit of regulation’
• regulatory processes make determinations ex ante; 
competition law decides on validity of actions ex post
• all of the predictions for the inefficient consequences of ex 
ante regulation came to pass in New Zealand (higher 
costs, not more timely, delays in new implementations)
• whilst counterfactuals difficult to project, the welfare 
outcomes post 2000 appear substantially smaller than prior
LESSONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES (cont)
3. Universal service obligations are problematic no 
matter which regime form is adopted
• efficiency and equity objectives are fundamentally 
incompatible
4. The tension between competition and efficiency is 
significant
• competition law regimes require very careful specification 
of the laws/tests of acceptable behaviour and relationship 
to efficiency
• regulation-based regimes enable efficiency to be 
considered, but the relationship to competition must be 
carefully specified in the enabling legislation
LESSONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES (cont)
5. Independence from political involvement is 
imperative
• competition and regulation are too important and too complex to 
be bound up in short-term populist politics
6. Size and context matter
• small markets are different
• who makes the investments matters
• dominant firm-competitive fringe equilibria may be ‘as good as it 
gets’ in small markets with high fixed/sunk costs
7. The telco world is changing
• consolidation into a smaller number of vertically integrated 
content/service/infrastructure providers becoming more 
common – effective management of oligopoly may be 
valuable knowledge in tomorrow’s markets 
